Towards a Theory of Architectural Contracts: Schemes and Patterns of Assumption/Promise Based System Specification

Manfred Broy





Contracts and Architectures





From interaction assertions to contracts



- Let R(x, y) be an assertion that characterizes the interaction between system S and its environment E, called interaction assertion.
- R provides an observation/specification of the traffic between E and S
- Can we derive of a contract for S from assertion R(x, y) that captures the obligations of system S w.r.t. R?

- It is clear that we cannot expect to get a reasonable contract from R(x, y) in every case.
- A simple example would be R(x, y) = false.



• Given the healthiness condition for the interface assertion

∃ x, y: R(x, y)

we can do a separation of R into an assumption and a promise (for the safety properties in R) as follows.

 We specify the responsibilities of the system S that accepts the input history x and issues and output history y such that assertion

R(x, y)

holds.

• We are looking for assertions asu(x, y) and pro(x, y) such that $asu(x, y) \land pro(x, y) \Rightarrow R(x, y)$

and

assumptionasu(x, y)promisepro(x, y)

is a healthy assumption promise specification.

 If R(x, y) is strongly causal in x and fully realizable, then asu(x, y) = true is a valid choice. • If

 $\forall x: \exists y: R(x, y)$

does not hold, then we need to construct an assumption asu(x, y) and a promise pro(x, y) such that

is causal in y and realizable

(2)
$$asu(x, y) \Rightarrow pro(x, y)$$

is strongly causal in x and realizable.

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and

(1) asu(x, y)

 $\mathsf{asu}(\mathsf{x},\,\mathsf{y}) \land \mathsf{pro}(\mathsf{x},\,\mathsf{y}) \Rightarrow \mathsf{R}(\mathsf{x},\,\mathsf{y})$

Given the specification

 $R(x, y) \equiv (x \approx y \land \forall t: (\#y \downarrow t) + b \ge \#x \downarrow t \land \#x \downarrow t \ge \#y \downarrow t)$ where x and y are streams of data and b is a given number and x \approx y specifies that x and y carry the same stream of messages (eliminating empty slots "-")

• We choose the assumption

asu(x, y) = \forall t: (#y \downarrow t)+b \geq #x \downarrow t

- asu(x, y) is causal in y and realizable.
- We choose the promise

 $pro(x, y) \equiv (x \approx y \land \forall t: \#x \downarrow t \geq \#y \downarrow t)$

- Assertion pro(x, y) is strongly causal and fully realizable.
- We get

 $\text{pro}(x, y) \land \text{asu}(x, y) \Rightarrow R(x, y)$

Example. Non-realizable Specification

 Consider a system with input channel x and output channel y both carrying boolean messages:

 $R(x, y) = [(true # x < \infty \Rightarrow true # y = \infty)$ $\land (true # x = \infty \Rightarrow true # y < \infty)]$

- All the involved assertions are liveness properties. We get
 ∀ x: ∃ y: R(x, y)
- However, there does not exist a causal function f with
 \forall x: R(x, f(x))
- Otherwise, there would exist a strongly causal function f with a fixpoint y = f(y) such that R(x, y) holds which delivers a contradiction.
- The example suggests that non-realizable specifications include liveness properties that cannot be realized.

Assumptions in Architectural Modelling





Example: Simple Watch Guard in a Car



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Glass Box Specification of a Car's Architecture



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The specification

 \forall t: \neg doors_closed(t) \Rightarrow act_speed(t) = 0

can only be guaranteed if the two inner components work together. This requires

 \forall t: \neg ready(t) \Rightarrow act_speed(t) = 0

Then the system specification holds if

 $\forall t: \neg doors_closed(t) \Rightarrow \neg ready(t)$

- This is logically equivalent to the A/P-specification for the WatchDog assumption: ∀ t: ¬ ready(t) ⇒ act_speed(t) = 0 promise: ∀ t: ¬ doors_closed(t) ⇒ act_speed(t) = 0
- In other words,
 - the overall system specification can be guaranteed by the watchdog
 - only if the assumption about the behaviour of the component motor holds.

Simple Watch Guard in a Car (Continued)



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• A/P-specification

assumption: $\forall t: \neg ready(t) \Rightarrow act_speed(t) = 0$ **promise**: $\forall t: \neg doors_closed(t) \Rightarrow act_speed(t) = 0$ is logically guaranteed by the simple specification

 \forall t: \neg doors_closed(t) $\Rightarrow \neg$ ready(t)

- This assertion no longer speaks about the specification of the environment, but is a pure interface specification.
- The example shows the simplification of an A/Pspecification to a plain interface assertion.

Designing Architectures





"Alternating-Bit"-Protocol





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We specify interface behaviour of system ABP by the interface assertion

 $\mathbf{X} \approx \mathbf{Y}$

and furthermore its architecture by the assertion $abp(x, z1, z2, z3, z4, y) \equiv$ $abs(z1) \approx x$ $\land abs(z2) \approx x$ $\land Data \# y = \# abs(z2)$ $\land Data \# x = \# abs(z3)$ $\land \# abs(z3) = \# abs(z4)$ $\land abs(z2) \approx y$

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- The auxiliary function abs eliminates all repeated elements and empty slots in a stream.
- The auxiliary function abs is described by following equations (using the auxiliary function del):

 $abs(\langle -\rangle^{2}) = abs(z)$ $abs(\langle e\rangle^{2}) = \langle e\rangle^{2}del(z, e)$ $del(\langle e\rangle^{2}, e) = del(z, e)$ $e \neq d \Rightarrow del(\langle d\rangle^{2}, e) = abs(\langle d\rangle^{2})$ $del(\langle -\rangle^{2}, e) = del(z, e)$

 Now we can look for specifications of the sub-systems that fulfil the requirements included in the architecture.

Deriving specifications for sub-interfaces

- We derive specifications for sub-interfaces as given by {z1, z4}
- From

∃ x, y, z2, z3: abp(x, z1, z2, z3, z4, y)

we derive

 \exists x: abs(z1) \approx x \land Data#x = #abs(z4)

from which we can derive

 \exists x: #abs(z1) = #abs(z4)

This expresses a condition for the two streams on channels z1 and z4.

- This condition does not indicate who is responsible for the liveness property included in the specification.
- The example shows a way to design architectures by designing first the specifications for the channel histories and then the specification for the components.

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- A/C specs address the logic of the architecture rather than separated interface specifications for the components
- From A/C specs we may derive separated interface specifications for the components by simplified assertions
- This gives a methodology towards a modular decomposition in architecture design

Outlook: Assumption/Promise for Non-functional Reqs





- Perspectives of the systematic application of assumption/promise patterns in system development for non-functional system properties.
- Dealing with non-functional requirements in requirements engineering.

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Rich Contracts: Specifying Non-Functional System Properties

- Non-functional properties deal with aspects of systems that do not address the system's behaviour.
- The formula (for all environments E):

 $\forall \mathsf{E:} \mathsf{Asu}(\mathsf{E}) \Rightarrow \mathsf{Pro}(\mathsf{S} \otimes \mathsf{E})$

specifies a contract Con(S) for system S.

- An example would be the weight of system $S \otimes E$.
- Assuming the simple rule

weight(S \otimes E) = weight(S) + weight(E)

being interested in the system specification (for given k)

weight(S \otimes E) \leq k

that requires a limit for the system's weight we get the formula (with k' < k)

 \forall E: weight(E) \leq k' \Rightarrow weight(S \otimes E) \leq k

which is equivalent to the proposition

weight(S) \leq k-k'

Remark on Non-functional Requirements

- It is not so obvious what it means that a property is "nonfunctional"
- If weight is a monitored or a controlled variable then it is part of the functional system properties
- We may distinguish between
 - qualitative properties
 - quantitative properties

Final Remarks

Rich specifications

- Probability
- Continuous time, continuous signals
- Quality by quantitative properties
 - Performance
 - Quantitative response times
 - Resource consumption
 - Reliability
 - Functional safety
 - Security
 - **◇** ...
- The goal is to treat all these properties in a modular way

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